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Abstract: Competition authorities typically issue Merger Guidelines setting out the 
framework within which merger assessment is conducted.  Ireland is no exception.  The 
Competition Authority is currently in the process of revising its 2002 Guidelines.  In this 
paper we not only comment on the procedure that is being used to revise these Guidelines 
as well as the substance of the proposed revisions to the Guidelines, but also draw some 
wider lessons that might be of assistance to other competition authorities, particularly 
smaller competition authorities, in revising their Guidelines.  The lessons include: carefully 
distinguishing between proposals for revising the Guidelines that incorporate existing 
merger assessment custom and proposals that mark a significant departure from current 
Guidelines as well as existing custom and practice.  Proposals for revising the Guidelines, 
particularly when referring to existing custom and practice, should be specific rather than 
general; and, if multijurisdictional mergers are important particular attention should be paid 
to the Guidelines in jurisdictions that are commonly included in such multijurisdictional 
mergers. 
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Revising Merger Guidelines: Lessons from the Irish Experience 
1. Introduction 
Merger Guidelines (“the Guidelines”) perform a number of valuable functions in facilitating a 
smooth, efficient and transparent merger control regime. They can not only minimise 
compliance or transaction costs for merging parties in dealing with a competition authority 
or agency, but also reduce the volume of public resources devoted to merger control.  At the 
same time the Guidelines, if appropriately structured, should only prohibit – or cause to be 
abandoned at an early stage – mergers that are likely to damage competition and consumer 
welfare, while permitting, not to say encouraging, mergers those that are likely to be pro-
competitive and promote consumer welfare.2   
Every so often Guidelines need to be updated.  Ireland is no exception.  Almost 
inevitably changes over time in merger analysis and administrative practice will necessitate 
reconsideration and debate.  The changes come from a variety of sources.  The Competition 
Authority’s current Guidelines, which date from 2002, (“the 2002 Guidelines”),3 were based 
on a limited experience with merger analysis.4  Since assuming control of the merger 
function from 1 January 2003 the Competition Authority has issued close to 500 merger 
determinations.5  There have been new developments in merger analysis, particularly in the 
US and UK, which it may be appropriate to include in the revised Guidelines such the use of 
measures of upward price pressure.6   
Ireland has been at the forefront in the International Competition Network (“ICN”) in 
developing guidelines for substantive merger analysis.  The Competition Authority is co-chair 
of the ICN Merger Working Group together with the US Department of Justice Antitrust 
                                                                                                                                                                      
 2  In some jurisdictions, such as Canada, the merger test is not consumer but total welfare.  However, the same 
point applies. 
3  Competition Authority (2002). 
4  Under the merger legislation prior to the Competition Act 2002, the Minister of Enterprise, Trade and 
Employment made occasional merger references to the Competition Authority to evaluate mergers using a 
series of broad public interest criteria, including whether or not the merger would “prevent or restrict 
competition.”  The Competition Authority’s reports, which were made public, however, were advisory only 
with the Minister making the final decision, but without any reasoned published decision explaining the 
rationale for the Minister’s decision.  For further discussion of this procedure see Massey and O’Hare (1996, 
pp.234-244).  In drawing up the 2002 Guidelines the Competition Authority relied on the expert legal, 
business, economic submissions as part of a consultation process as well as the Guidelines of other 
competition agencies, particularly those in the US.   
5  Of course, not all of these mergers required extensive analysis and application of the 2002 Guidelines and as 
a result that are not all equally relevant in considering the revision of the 2002 Guidelines.  In earlier work 
Gorecki et al (2007, Table III, p. 356) came to the conclusion that over the period 2003-2006 of the 311 
merger notifications 22 or 7 per cent required extensive analysis.  
6  See Section VI below for further discussion. 
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Division.7 One of the objectives of the working group is to diffuse best practice in merger 
control through, for example, recommended practices.  To the extent there is success in 
such diffusion it reduces transaction costs for mergers, especially those that need to be 
notified in more than one jurisdiction.   
Finally, leading competition authorities have recently issued new Guidelines: the EU in 
2008, the UK and US in 2010.8  Like Ireland, these jurisdictions employ the substantial 
lessening of competition (“SLC”) test or a variant which is very similar.9 In drawing up the 
2002 Guidelines considerable reliance was placed on the US Guidelines.   Furthermore, it is 
not uncommon for mergers notified to the Competition Authority also to be notified to the 
UK, such as Kingspan’s proposed acquisition of Xtratherm (Competition Authority, 2006a) or 
more recently ESB’s proposed acquisition of NIE (Competition Authority, 2010f; OFT, 2010).  
It is therefore important that cognisance is taken of UK Guidelines in order to ensure – to 
the maximum extent possible – that the two sets of Guidelines are consistent with each 
other.     
The Competition Authority’s December 2010 Consultation on Competition Authority 
Guidelines for Merger Analysis (“Consultation Paper”),10 which contains a series of proposals 
for revising the 2002 Guidelines is therefore timely.  The purpose of this paper is twofold: 
first, a review of the procedures and processes as well as the methodology or approach used 
for making substantive proposals for revising the 2002 Guidelines; and, second, to 
determine what lessons can be learnt from the Irish merger review experience that will be of 
wider applicability for other jurisdictions, particularly smaller competition authorities.11  It is 
hoped that these lessons will be useful for such authorities in considering how to go about 
revising Guidelines, what to include in proposals for revised Guidelines and, how to structure 
such proposals.  Thus the purpose of the paper is not to set out what should be in the 
optimal set of Guidelines, but rather to inform the debate on how to go about deriving such 
a set of Guidelines. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
7  For details see: http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/working-groups/current/merger.aspx.  
Accessed 6 January 2011. 
8  CC&OFT (2010); USDoJ&FTC (2010); and EC (2008).  Note that the US Guidelines referred to horizontal 
mergers, the UK to both horizontal and non-horizontal, the EC to non-horizontal.  The EC has separate 2004 
horizontal Guidelines (EC, 2004b). The 2002 Guidelines refer to both horizontal and non-horizontal mergers. 
9  The UK and the US use the SLC test, the EU since 2004, uses a similar test, the significantly impeding effective 
competition test. 
10  Competition Authority (2010a). 
11  In recent survey involving 257 participants in 60 jurisdictions, competition authorities were ranked in terms 
of their institutional efficiency of merger control, using indicators under headings such as ‘Independent’, 
‘Predictable’, ‘Reliable’, and ‘Unbiased’.  It found that Ireland ranked second to Canada in terms of 
institutional efficiency of merger systems.  For details see Ganslandt (2010). 
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The paper is structured as follows.  Section II discusses the objectives, origin and 
audiences of Guidelines, which apply to virtually all jurisdictions and hence have wider 
applicability.  Section III deals with the content of the Consultation Paper and the steps and 
procedures taken and expected to be taken in revising the 2002 Guidelines.  Section IV 
provides general comments on the Consultation Paper before attention turns in Section V to 
comments on several of the specific proposals made in the Consultation Paper.  An issue not 
raised in the Consultation Paper is discussed in Section VI.  A concluding section brings 
together the threads of the paper by drawing lessons from the Irish experience that are 
likely to have wider applicability. 
2. Objective, purpose and audiences of guidelines 
The Irish Competition Authority’s current Guidelines set out the way in which it evaluates 
the mergers notified to it under the Competition Act 2002 (“the Act”).  These 2002 
Guidelines state that they “offer guidance on how the Authority decides whether or not a 
merger substantially lessens competition …” (Competition Authority, 2002, para 1.1).  While 
the Act specifies the SLC test to be applied to mergers, the interpretation and application of 
the competition test is left to an expert body, the Competition Authority, which has a 
considerable degree of discretion in this regard.  Since it is not obvious what the competition 
test means in practice, the 2002 Guidelines fill this lacuna. 
The Guidelines are aimed at a number of different audiences.  First, and most 
obviously, the merging parties to a transaction.  This includes not only the businesses 
involved in the merger, but also their legal and economic advisors.  The Guidelines permit 
the merging parties to make the case as to why a merger does not lead to SLC in terms 
readily understood by the Competition Authority, while at same time not initiating mergers 
that are likely to lead to SLC.  The merging parties thus concentrate their resources on the 
salient factors, rather than issues that may have little relevance.  Resources are used in an 
optimal way, provided, of course, the Guidelines are clear and readily accessible. 
Second, the Guidelines are used by the Competition Authority to ensure that it 
employs a consistent approach to merger analysis.  As in any organisation there is staff 
turnover.  For example, between 1 January 2003, when the Competition Authority assumed 
responsibility for merger control under the Act, and 1 January 2011, four different members 
of the Competition Authority have been charged with responsibility for mergers, with 
5 
varying backgrounds.12 The Guidelines assist in ensuring the same methodology is applied 
over time.  They provide the template for Competition Authority merger analysis.  This is re-
enforced by the fact that all merger determinations of the Competition Authority are 
published on its website, with references to the 2002 Guidelines used to justify a particular 
approach taken.13 If these determinations depart from the 2002 Guidelines in a material way 
then merging parties would likely use these precedents in arguments concerning SLC, thus 
undermining the credibility and usefulness of the 2002 Guidelines. 
Third, the Courts, to which Competition Authority merger determinations can be 
appealed.   Of course, in an ideal world there would few, if any, appeals since the Guidelines 
and their application would be clear and transparent so that prior to a decision of a firm to 
merge, the merging parties would be able to predict, with a reasonable degree of certainty, 
the outcome of the merger review process.14  Since the Competition Authority has assumed 
responsibility for merger control in 2003 there has been only one appeal concerning a 
merger determination.15  Given the infrequent nature of such appeals, the Guidelines may 
be of use in assisting the Courts in reviewing a merger determination.16  Since it is, of course, 
the Courts that have the final say in what terms such as SLC mean, any judgment of the 
Court could be used to revise the Guidelines.  However, one would expect that the Courts 
would show some curial deference to a specialist expert body such as the Competition 
                                                                                                                                                                      
12  Terry Calvani (January to August 2003), Edward Henneberry (September 2003 to January 2006), Paul K. 
Gorecki (February 2006-December 2008), and Stanley Wong (January 2009 to February 2011).  Furthermore 
these individuals came from different backgrounds, some legal and others economics. Two came from the 
US, one from Canada, one the UK. 
13  For example, reference is often made to the fact that the 2002 Guidelines state that entry must be timely, 
likely and sufficient in order to constrain a post-merger price increase.  For the reference to entry in the 2002 
Guidelines see Competition Authority (2002, paras 5.1 to 5.5); for an example of the application of these 
criteria see Competition Authority (2008a, paras 3.71 to 3.75) in the Kerry/Breeo merger.    
14  This, of course, abstracts from the third parties to a merger that may bring appeals for strategic reasons 
unrelated to the clarity of the Guidelines and the quality of the merger determinations.  However, under the 
Act third parties have very limited opportunities to appeal Competition Authority merger determinations. 
15  This concerned the Kerry/Breeo merger (Competition Authority, 2008a) in which the Authority’s prohibition 
determination was declared null and void by the High Court.  This latter decision is under appeal to the 
Supreme Court.  
16  In the Kerry/Breeo High Court judgment there are several references to the 2002 Merger Guidelines: the 
substance of the 2002 Guidelines are set out (paras 3.10 to 3. 12); the observation is made that the structure 
of the Competition Authority’s merger determination in the case followed the 2002 Guidelines (para. 4.2); 
one of the grounds for appeal was that the Competition Authority did not follow its 2002 Guidelines in 
dealing with the issue of supply side substitutability (para 6.1.B), the fact that the Competition Authority 
relied on demand side substitutability as set out in the 2002 Guidelines (para 7.19);  and, on the issue of 
supply side substitutability the issue of the 2002 Guidelines are cited in the Competition Authority defence 
(paras 8.8 and 8.9), with which the Court appears to agree (paras 8.22 & 8.23).  It would seem reasonable to 
assume that the Court accepts the 2002 Guidelines as a basis for merger assessment.  The High Court 
judgment, Rye Investments Ltd and the Competition Authority, which was delivered on 19 March 2009,  may 




Authority,17 which is referred to as a margin of appreciation in the parlance of the European 
Courts.18  
Fourth, the general public, legislators and others interested in public administration.  
In the interests of openness and accountability agencies such as the Competition Authority 
set out how they go about their business.  Guidelines and the merger determinations are 
important part of this process for the Competition Authority.  However, there is frequently a 
need to supplement these Guidelines and determinations with presentations concerning the 
merger control regime to these broader audiences to answer questions and dispel 
misperceptions that may arise.  In some instances merger determinations have been 
associated with subsequent plant closures and job losses19 neither of which is considered as 
part of the merger review process and are more appropriately dealt with through other 
policy instruments relating to the labour market and growth.20 
Fifth, to the extent that bodies other than the Competition Authority are charged with 
administering merger law in Ireland, particularly if they lack the necessary in-house 
expertise, the Guidelines may be useful informing their deliberations.  In 2008, in response 
to the financial crisis, legislation transferred responsibility for mergers which concerned the 
stability of the financial system to the Minister of Finance.21  Furthermore, the Minister is 
allowed to set aside any finding he might make that the merger would lead to SLC, in the 
interests of the stability of financial system.  The Department of Finance is not an expert in 
competition policy.  However, the 2002 Guidelines are available to the Department of 
Finance to assist in ensuring consistent application of the competition test across all sectors 
of the economy.22  
                                                                                                                                                                      
17  On the issue of curial deference in the Kerry/Breeo High Court judgment see Gorecki (2009a). 
18  For a discussion see Whish (2009, pp. 879-885). 
19  See, for example, the Heineken/Scottish & Newcastle merger (Competition Authority, 2008b). 
20  Such a perception could arise since under the merger control regime prior to 2003, whether to permit a 
merger depended on broad public interest or common good criteria which included ‘level of employment,’ 
‘employees,’ and ‘shareholders and partners.’   For further discussion see references in footnote 2 above.  
21  For further details see Competition Authority (2009d, p. 36; 2010g, p. 36) and Gorecki (2009b, p. 223-224).  
The Government could have course followed the UK example where the competition analysis is conducted by 
the competition agency (i.e. the Office of Fair Trading) and the decision concerning wider concerns taken 
separately by the relevant Minister.  Since the Minister of Finance might also be party to the merger in the 
first place, the Minister will act as a promoter of the merger and then assessing it under both competition 
test and the financial stability concerns, which might give rise to conflicts of interest.   
22  There is legislative provision for the Department of Finance to seek the assistance of the Competition 
Authority, which is ready to provide such assistance. 
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3. The Consultation Paper 
The Competition Authority’s Consultation Paper23 was issued on 3 December 2010.   In the 
news release accompanying the Consultation Paper, the Competition Authority stated that: 
“by carrying out a public consultation on the merger guidelines at this stage, the 
Competition Authority hopes to be able to publish new merger guidelines without delay 
after any legislative amendments relating to the Act come into force” (Competition 
Authority, 2010h).  Hence it appeared that after considering all the submissions made in 
response to the Consultation Paper, new Guidelines would be issued, subject to legislative 
timing considerations.  However, the position was subsequently clarified.24  Instead of 
proceeding directly to new Guidelines, draft Guidelines would be issued first for comment 
and discussion.  This is a sensible decision, particularly in view of the shortcomings identified 
below in the proposals contained in the Consultation Paper.  However, irrespective of these 
shortcomings, exposing the draft Guidelines to comment is a sensible step before 
finalisation of the Guidelines takes place.   
The Consultation Paper sets out twelve elements for comment relating to: 
• Measurement of market definition; 
• Market structure; 
• SLC; 
• Theories of harm; 
• Failing firms; 
• Competitive constraints; 
• The counterfactual; 
• Entry; 
• Countervailing buyer power; 
• Efficiencies; 
• Maverick firms; and, 
• Remedies. 
These elements are undoubtedly very important for merger analysis.  Indeed, they go 
to the core of merger analysis.  The 2002 Guidelines already cover most of these elements, 
although in two instances, theories of harm and the counterfactual, implicitly rather than 
                                                                                                                                                                      
23  Competition Authority (2010a).  It may be accessed at: 
http://www.tca.ie/images/uploaded/documents/2010-12-
03%20Notice%20of%20Consultation%20on%20Competition%20Authority%20Merger%20Guidelines.PDF.  
24  See the Competition Authority’s annual report for 2010 (Competition Authority, 2011, p. 3). 
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explicitly.  In only one instance, remedies, the topic is not referred to at all in the 2002 
Guidelines.  Thus to a considerable extent the proposals would appear to be a refinement of 
2002 Guidelines rather than a radical departure, at least in terms of the topics identified for 
discussion and comment. 
For each of the twelve elements the Consultation Paper provides a paragraph or two 
of by way of background on the issue or element and then makes a proposal(s) for revising 
the 2002 Guidelines.  In only one instance, market structure, is a specific question raised 
with respect to the proposals.  Apart from citing two merger determinations in discussing 
the failing firm defence, reference to Competition Authority merger determinations in the 
Consultation Paper are conspicuous by their absence.  In this paper numerous references are 
made to merger determinations to illustrate Competition Authority thinking and practice.  
Nevertheless, reference is made, in tabular form, in the Consultation Paper to developments 
in other jurisdictions by citing relevant passages from the Australian, UK and US Guidelines.25  
An examination of the proposals confirms that they mark a refinement and evolution in the 
Competition Authority’s approach to merger analysis rather than a radical departure.  
4. Some General Comments 
In examining the specific proposals relating to the twelve elements, the Consultation Paper 
suggests that respondents address the following questions.  First, to what extent is the 
approach taken the right one; and, second, what additional or alternative proposals should 
be considered.26 Before turning to the proposals themselves in Section V, the first question 
with respect to the approach taken by the Consultation Paper as a whole is addressed in this 
section.  Several general comments on proposals in the Consultation Paper can be made.  
These can be divided into two broad groups: the overall approach taken by the Competition 
Authority in framing the proposals; and certain common themes or concerns that arise in 
several of the proposals.  The first two comments below fall into the former category; while 
the remaining four comments into the latter category.    There is inevitably, however, some 
overlap between the two.   
First, it is not obvious that the approach of the Consultation Paper of couching the 
proposals “in fairly general terms in order to provide a basis for discussion” (Competition 
Authority, 2010a, para 1.6) is appropriate.  While it is clearly important to encourage debate 
                                                                                                                                                                      
25  The Australian Guidelines are dated 2008. For details see Australian Competition & Consumer Commission 
(2008). 
26  Competition Authority (2010a, p. 3).  A third question is posed asking for alternative proposals to those set 
out in the Consultation Paper. However, this is not a general question and will be dealt with in considering 
the twelve elements mentioned in the text. 
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and discussion in reviewing the 2002 Guidelines, it is not readily apparent that general as 
opposed to specific proposals are likely to elicit more or less discussion.  Since the Guidelines 
represent the way in which the Competition Authority administers the competition test 
based on its custom and practice it would seem more useful for it to put forward in concrete 
terms how it thinks matters have evolved (or should evolve) and ask for comment on its 
proposals.  There is nothing to prevent respondents disagreeing and putting forward 
additional or alternative proposals.   
Second, there are issues relating to the usefulness of responses in relation to 
proposals of a general nature.  This in turn has implications for the efficiency and efficacy of 
revising the 2002 Guidelines.  Consultation is not a cost free exercise either for the 
Competition Authority or those responding.  It requires time and resources to carefully 
consider responses and for the Competition Authority to then respond.  Reading the 
Consultation Paper it is clear that the Competition Authority has in mind certain quite 
specific changes when it talks about amending, updating, clarifying, defining, describing, 
providing more details and so on.  Why are these not presented as part of the Consultation 
Paper?  The difficulty with general proposals is that the discussion is likely to be unfocussed 
since it is not always clear what the Competition Authority has in mind.  Indeed, there is 
nothing wrong with the Competition Authority having rather specific and detailed changes 
for consultation.  It will not be until the Competition Authority issues new draft Guidelines, 
based on the responses to the Consultation Paper, that comment and discussion can be 
made on precisely what the Competition Authority has in mind. 
Third, it is not always clear in the Consultation Paper whether the proposals 
incorporate the existing practice of the Competition Authority, as it has evolved since 2003, 
or whether the proposal is a change to current practice.  In other words, the distinction 
between what is and what ought to be or what could be.  This is important.  As noted above 
the purpose of the Guidelines is to set out the way in which the Competition Authority 
assesses mergers under the competition test, SLC.  That changes overtime as set out in the 
determinations of the Competition Authority.  Hence updating and revising the Guidelines is 
a useful exercise.   
This is not to say that the Consultation Paper should not make proposals that presage 
a change in practice.  The Consultation Paper proposes to drop the 3 per cent price 
threshold in discussing the issue of substitutability, despite the fact that it is in the 2002 
Guidelines and has been employed by the Competition Authority in recent merger 
determinations (Competition Authority, 2008a, para 5.65).  The Consultation Paper proposes 
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another new departure: estimating the distribution of efficiency gains to consumers, staff 
and shareholders in the analysis of efficiencies  However, it is important that these proposals 
for change are labelled as such, since there is likely to be much more flexibility in the 
position of the Competition Authority compared to a situation where it is updating the 
Guidelines to reflect current practice.   
Fourth, in a number of instances the proposals lack sufficient precision.  In some 
instances this is because the proposal is incomplete.  For example, the Consultation Paper 
proposes under SLC, “to define what is meant conceptually by the term “substantially lessen 
competition”’ (Competition Authority, 2010a, para 2.10).   However, no definition or 
discussion follows.  Presumably in making such a proposal the Competition Authority has a 
sense of what this term means, beyond what is already in the 2002 Guidelines (Competition 
Authority, 2002, para 1.3), which refers to a consumer welfare test and the various 
dimensions of competition such as price, quality, etc that might be affected adversely by a 
merger leading to a finding of SLC.  Furthermore, the response to the Consultation Paper’s 
proposal in this and other instances might depend in part on what definition is supplied by 
the Competition Authority.  It may, for example, confuse or complicate the situation 
compared to the current discussion.  Furthermore, there is a danger that by providing too 
much detail and discussion that the Competition Authority may compromise itself in future 
merger determinations should new anticipated situations arise which the current 
formulation would have been capable of covering. 
In other instances it is not at clear what the proposal means.  It is too vague.  For 
example, reference under competitive constraints, the proposal is made to “provide a more 
complete discussion of competitive constraints, within the context of competitive effects 
analysis” (Competition Authority, 2010a, para 2.17).  This suggests that something is missing 
from the current discussion in the 2002 Guidelines, primarily in Section 4, ‘Analysis of 
Immediate Competitive Effects.’  But this raises the question of what the Competition 
Authority thinks is missing from the 2002 Guidelines.  The Consultation Paper is silent on this 
issue.      
The same criticism can be applied to the discussion of theories of harm.  Here the 
proposal is to “provide a more detailed and nuanced description of the various theories of 
harm, addressing for example, harm from unilateral effects, co-ordinated effects and effects 
from non-horizontal mergers” (Competition Authority, 2010a, para 2.12).  Again it is not 
clear what will change here given the existing discussion in 2002 Guidelines (Competition 
Authority, 2002, Section 4 and Section 6), apart from a richer discussion of non-horizontal 
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mergers based on the Commission’s Guidelines in this area,27 the formulation of which the 
Competition Authority participated in the development of and which has been applied by 
the Competition Authority in its merger decisions (e.g. Competition Authority, 2007d).  
Furthermore there are a number of merger decision in which quite extensive theories of 
harm have been developed (e.g. Competition Authority, 2007a), but no reference is made to 
this experience in the Consultation Paper.  
The same comment can be made of the proposals on entry where the somewhat 
tentative proposal is made that the 2002 Guidelines, “could be amended to include a more 
complete discussion of the underlying factors that can affect timeliness, likelihood and scale 
of entry” (Competition Authority, 2010a, para 2.21).  There is no suggestion that the current 
approach set out in the 2002 Guidelines is to be changed (Competition Authority, 2002a, 
paras. 5.3-5.6).  What are the underlying factors that the Competition Authority thinks could 
be added and perhaps which merger determinations could be used to illustrate the factors 
mentioned?  The Consultation Paper is silent on both of these issues and so it is difficult, if 
not impossible, to comment. 
Fifth, in a number of instances it is not at all clear that some or all of the proposals 
made in the Consultation Paper are not already included in the 2002 Guidelines.  In other 
words, the proposal is redundant, irrelevant. For example, under market definition, there is 
a proposal to amend and update to clarify the 2002 Guidelines that “market definition and 
the SSNIP test, while useful analytical tools for merger review, cannot by themselves identify 
the competitive impact of a merger” Competition Authority (2010a, para 2.6).  However, 
there is no suggestion in the 2002 Guidelines that market definition can or should be used 
for this purpose.  On the contrary the opposite is the case.  For example, the 2002 Guidelines 
state that the relevant product and geographic markets “establish the framework in which 
the analysis of competition takes place” (Competition Authority, 2002, para 1.6(a)) and later 
it is stated the market definition framework “provides a basis for analysis in which existing 
competitors and consumers who are likely to provide the most immediate and timely 
competitive constraint are identified …” (ibid, para 2.1).  Equally, as discussed below in 
Section V, reference is made in discussing the failing firm to proposals made by the ICN, one 
of which is exactly mirrored in the 2002 Guidelines. 
Sixth, the Consultation Paper makes numerous references to its proposals being 
consistent with international best practice and draws to only a limited extent on the merger 
review experience of the Competition Authority.  Indeed, reference is made to only two of 
                                                                                                                                                                      
27  European Commission (2008). 
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the close to 500 merger determinations that the Competition Authority has made since 1 
January 2003.  This is not to deny that cognisance has to be taken of international best 
practice.  Clearly for a small agency such as the Competition Authority developments 
elsewhere will inform its practice.  However, the Consultation Paper should spell out in more 
detail why international best practice should be followed, if it differs from current 
Competition Authority practice and how that can be expected improve the 2002 Guidelines. 
5. Specific Proposals: Getting Down to Brass Tacks 
In this section attention is paid to the twelve specific topics on which the Consultation Paper 
makes specific proposals.  However, for several of these topics – SLC, theories of harm, and 
entry – comment has already been made above in Section IV so that there is no need to 
rehearse that discussion.  As a result only a subset of the topics are considered: 
measurement of market definition; market structure; failing firms; competitive constraints; 
the counterfactual; countervailing buyer power; efficiencies; maverick firms; and, remedies. 
Measurement of Market Definition 
The Consultation Paper proposals with respect to the measurement of market definition 
sensibly set out some aspects of existing Competition Authority custom and practice as well 
as restating, as noted above, rather less sensibly material that is already in the 2002 
Guidelines (Competition Authority, 2010a, paras 2.3–2.6).  Market definition is not always 
necessary in practice in considering whether or not a notified merger leads to SLC.  The 
activities of the merging parties may be quite disparate, with no overlap either horizontal or 
vertical. A review of Competition Authority determinations provides many examples such as 
the acquisition of twenty-four health and fitness clubs by Barclays Bank (Competition 
Authority, 2010b).  Equally, the merger may not lead to SLC on any reasonable market 
definition, thus the Competition Authority does not need to come to definitive view as to 
market definition. For example, in considering a merger in the retail supply of agricultural 
inputs to farmers, the Competition Authority did not have to consider whether the 
geographic market was regional or national since the conclusions as to the impact of the 
merger were unaffected by this choice (Competition Authority, 2009a, para 30).  In contrast, 
where there is significant overlap in the activities of the merging parties then defining the 
market is the norm.  In some instances this can be an elaborate exercise, with alcoholic 
beverages being a particularly striking example (Competition Authority, 2008b). 
Although not listed as an explicit proposal, the Consultation Paper intends to update 
the types of evidence required in defining relevant markets “in the light of both 
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international best practice and also the Competition Authority’s experience” (Competition 
Authority, 2010a, para 2.5).  Presently the 2002 Guidelines contain little or nothing on the 
types of evidence that can and should be used to define markets.  The Competition 
Authority has built up considerable experience in its various merger determinations in the 
use of different types of evidence to define markets.  The types of evidence include: 
• Internal documents (e.g. Competition Authority, 2004a, 2008b, 2007c). 
• Authority questionnaires/surveys of business and consumers (e.g. Competition 
Authority, 2008b, 2004a). 
• Correlation analysis (e.g. Competition Authority, 2008b, 2007b). 
• Demand estimation (e.g. Competition Authority, 2007b, 2008a). 
There is also the issue of the value of documents and other evidence that are created post-
consideration of the merger compared with that created before any obvious consideration 
of the merger, an issue discussed further below under ‘Countervailing Buyer Power.’  In 
structuring and framing the discussion of evidence the Competition Authority might like to 
follow the US Guidelines where the useful distinction is drawn between types and sources 
(USDoJ&FTC, 2010, pp. 2-6).  Neither the UK nor Australian Guidelines discuss the issue of 
evidence.  As the Competition Authority quite rightly states it has considerable experience 
on which to draw some of which has already been analysed (Gorecki et al, 2007). 
The US (USDoJ&FTC, 2010, pp. 13-15) and UK (CC&OFT, 2010, pp. 36-38)  Guidelines in 
defining the relevant geographic market, draw the distinction between markets based on 
location of suppliers and location of customers.  This is a useful distinction that should assist 
in resolving on what on occasion can be a difficult issue.   
Effects of Merger on Market Structure 
The Consultation Paper raises the issue of whether or not the thresholds and the delta for 
screening mergers using the Herfindahl-Hirshmann Index (“HHI”) should be revised 
(Competition Authority, 2010a, para 2.7).  In the 2002 Guidelines Zone C mergers are those 
which “occur in already highly concentrated markets and more usually be those that raise 
competitive concerns” (Competition Authority, 2002, para 3.10).  The post-merger Zone C 
threshold is an HHI above 1800, with a delta of greater than 100, where delta is the change 
in the HHI as a result of the merger.28  Reference is made in the Consultation Paper to the 
2010 US Guidelines where the safe harbour post HHI threshold level was raised from 1800 to 
                                                                                                                                                                      
28  In other words, if a merger results in 5.5 equal sized firms each with more than 18 per cent of the market and 
a firm with 20 per cent of the market acquiring one with at least 2.5 per cent then it may raises competitive 
concerns.   
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2500 and the delta was raised from 100 to 200.29  These changes, as one commentator 
remarked, “likely brings the proposed [US] Guidelines more in line with actual practice than 
existing [US] Guidelines” (Carlton, 2010, p. 10).  If this is the case for the US then it suggests 
that the Competition Authority carefully review its past merger determinations in coming to 
a view as to whether or not the merger thresholds should be reviewed.   Mergers subject to 
review in the US may be quite different in terms of industry composition and type (unilateral 
vs. co-ordinated), necessitating different thresholds.  Unless the Competition Authority can 
make a solid case for change based on its own record, the existing thresholds should be 
retained.  
Failing Firm 
The Competition Authority has rarely, if ever, cleared a merger based solely on the failing 
firm defence.30  Its use has also been infrequent in other jurisdictions.31  Indeed, although 
the merging parties have on occasion argued the failing firm defence the merger has been 
cleared by the Competition Authority on other grounds (e.g. Competition Authority, 2009b, 
2010c, 2010d, and 2010e).32  The Consultation Paper’s proposal to clarify that even if the 
firm is failing it may not be necessary to assess whether it meets the 2002 Guidelines criteria 
for a failing firm, since the merger may be capable of being cleared on the SLC test alone 
(Competition Authority, 2010a, para 2.14).  In other words, the counterfactual is that the 
acquired or target firm will continue in business.   In terms of the resources of the 
Competition Authority as well as the merging parties, it might prove far less onerous to 
assess the merger in terms of its competitive effects, than having to determine if one or 
both of the merging parties satisfy the failing firm criteria, with the possibility of a Phase II 
referral.  If mergers cannot relatively easily meet the failing firm defence in the midst of the 
worst recession since the Great Depression then it is not clear that the test will ever be 
met.33  
The 2002 Merger Guidelines specify four conditions that must be satisfied in order for 
the failing firm defence to be met (Competition Authority, 2002, para 5.17) and remarks 
                                                                                                                                                                      
29  In other words, if the merger results in four equal sized firms each with 25 per cent of the market and a firm 
with 20 per cent of the market acquires a firm with at least 5 per cent of the market. 
30  One reason may be that the target of the merger transaction, seeking to maximise the value of the sale, has 
little incentive to stress it may be failing firm nature, since that would lower its expected return from the sale.  
31  See Oxera (2009) which refers to successful examples of the failing firm defence in the UK, the EU, France, 
New Zealand and Germany.  
32  See also the discussion in the Competition Authority’s annual report for 2010 on rescue mergers 
(Competition Authority, 2011, p. 35). 
33  However, it could be argued, that this does not necessarily follow.  It may be, for example, that during a 
recession the number of mergers declines and that defensive mergers become much more important. 
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with some prescience that such “conditions may rarely be met in practice” (ibid, para. 5.17).  
The Consultation Paper proposes to update the Merger Guidelines in view of recent 
international developments including the ICN’s Recommended Practice on ‘Failing 
Firm/Exiting Assets.’ (Consultation Paper, 2010a, para 2.13).  The Competition Authority 
then proposes to indicate what constitutes a failing firm and identify any issues specific to 
failing firms that the Competition Authority would likely address including whether the exit 
would occur absent the merger (ibid, para 2.14).   It could be argued that the 2002 Merger 
Guidelines already cover some of the material that the Consultation Paper says will be 
added.  There is already a definition of a failing firm – “if part or all of the merging assets are 
certain to exit the market” (Competition Authority, 2002, para 5.17).  The Consultation 
Paper proposal will elaborate this somewhat by adding “thereby reducing the quantity of 
choices of goods and services available to consumers.”  Furthermore the four conditions that 
need to be satisfied under the 2002 Merger Guidelines with regard to the failing firm 
defence (ibid, para 5.17) match the four conditions in the ICN Recommended Practice almost 
exactly.34 Hence it is not clear what is being added.  It would have been helpful if the 
Consultation Paper had clarified matters in this regard. 
Competitive Constraints35 
In considering mergers in differentiated products it is important to consider the extent to 
which the products of the merging parties, A and B, are close substitutes as the 2002 Merger 
Guidelines notes (Competition Authority, 2002, para. 4.6).  The closer the degree of 
substitution the greater the incentive for the merged entity to raise prices of product A since 
consumers of product A that decide to switch will mainly move to product B and thus these 
sales will not be lost to the merged entity.  The 2002 Guidelines address the issue of 
determining whether substitutes are close, by posing the question whether it would be 
profitable for the merged entity to raise the price of A by 3 per cent, which as noted above 
in Section IV is a threshold that the Competition Authority has employed in recent merger 
determinations.  The 3 per cent threshold is lower “than the test for substitutability at the 
market definition level ...” (ibid, para. 4.6).   
The Consultation Paper proposes to abolish the 3 per cent threshold since 
international best practice does not specify a magnitude measure of substitutability 
                                                                                                                                                                      
34  See http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc316.pdf.  The ‘Failing Firm/Exiting 
Assets’ are Recommended Practices VIII and VIII.B is the recommended practice referred to in the text.  
Accessed 18 January 2011. 
35  The other proposals with respect to competitive constraint concerning the move to “provide a more 
complete discussion of competitive constraints, within the context of competitive constraints analysis” 
(Competition Authority, 2010a, para. 2.17) are discussed above. 
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(Competition Authority, 2010a, para. 2.16).  The ICN Recommended Practice V.B in 
considering mergers in differentiated products comments that competition authorities 
“should assess whether the merger would allow the merged firm profitably to increase price 
on one or more products after the merger, or whether sufficient customers would switch to 
products of other competitors so as to render such a price increase unprofitable for the 
merged firm” (ICN, 2010, p. 20).  Thus the Competition Authority is proposing to retain the 
concept of a considering a price increase but removing the threshold.  In other words, there 
will be a degree of discretion and judgment.  However, that will always be the case, given 
the precision with which these things can be measured.  The issue thus turns on whether the 
Competition Authority finds the 3 per cent threshold useful in merger analysis, the extent to 
which it is used and whether its removal would assist its analysis.  However, none of these 
things are discussed. 
The Counterfactual 
In merger analysis two states of the world are being compared in the period following the 
merger: the world with the merger; and, the world without the merger.  The latter situation 
is referred to as the counterfactual, it is what would happen absent the merger.  Merger 
analysis is then concerned with whether or not, by comparing these two states of the world, 
the merger will result in SLC.  The world absent the merger is usually approximated by pre-
merger market situation in merger analysis, unless there are good reasons for concluding 
that this is inappropriate.  The 2002 Guidelines, for example, refer to the use of prevailing 
prices “unless such prices are not a relevant counterfactual” (Competition Authority, 2002, 
para. 2.6).  The 2002 Guidelines continue, however, by stating that “[A]lternately, likely 
future prices, absent the merger, may be used when they can be predicted with some 
confidence, such as, for example, upcoming changes in regulations that affect prices directly, 
or indirectly via costs and demand” (ibid, para. 2.6).  Equally the 2002 Guidelines in 
considering a merger that eliminates a firm that is about to enter the market state that the 
“merger removes a competitive constraint relative to the counterfactual situation of greater 
rivalry” (ibid, para 4.26 (b)). 
An examination of the Competition Authority merger determinations again 
demonstrates how the status quo or prevailing situation is considered the relevant 
counterfactual.  In the Grafton/Heiton merger, for example, substantial efforts were made 
to determine the degree to which entrants in local markets were likely to enter absent the 
merger (Competition Authority, 2004a, paras 5.10-5.11).  In the Heineken/Scottish & 
Newcastle merger, complex licensing arrangements of brands meant that it was not clear at 
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first sight what was the relevant counterfactual, a situation that evoked much discussion and 
analysis in the merger determination (Competition Authority, 2008b, paras 5.2-5.13).   
Similarly in merger determinations concerning failing firm, the counterfactual may not 
be obvious.  In the Metro/Herald AM merger for example three counterfactuals are outlined, 
two by the merging parties and one by the Competition Authority (Competition Authority, 
2009c, paras. 5.2-5.7).  However, the Competition Authority does not appear to come to a 
view as to which is the most likely counterfactual nor that it is not necessary to take such a 
decision, since the competitive effects analysis is unaffected by the choice.  Instead, it is not 
clear that these three counterfactuals play any role in the subsequent analysis of the merger 
determination.  Hence, it is important that if more than one counterfactual is proposed that 
the analysis takes this into account in any competition analysis.  
The Consultation Paper proposes that the 2002 Guidelines should be amended to 
describe the concept of the counterfactual, illustrate the use of the counterfactual in 
Competition Authority merger determinations and highlight the importance of identifying 
the relevant counterfactual, which will usually be the situation prior to the merger 
(Competition Authority, 2010a, para. 2.19).  These suggestions usefully state current practice 
by the Competition Authority and make explicit what is implicit in the 2002 Guidelines.  The 
discussion could be incorporated into the 2002 Guidelines when discussing SLC at the very 
beginning of the revised Guidelines.  However, it is important in revising the 2002 Guidelines 
to stress that merely identifying alternative counterfactual(s) is only a necessary first step 
and is not sufficient.  A judgment is needed as to which is the most likely counterfactual to 
occur, absent the merger, which can then used in subsequent analysis or if the competitive 
effects analysis is the same irrespective of the counterfactual selected then a choice among 
the different counterfactuals is not necessary.  While in most merger cases the pre-merger 
world is the appropriate counterfactual this will not always be the case, particularly in the 
current recession. 
Countervailing Buyer Power 
Countervailing buyer power is frequently argued by merging parties as a reason why a 
merger will not lead to SLC.  Large and powerful buyers, such as retailers, will, it is argued, 
neutralise any price increase of the merged entity.  However, although countervailing buyer 
power is often claimed in merger notifications to the Competition Authority, after careful 
investigation, the Competition Authority rarely concurs.   The treatment of countervailing 
buyer power in the 2002 Guidelines is confined to a single paragraph which argues that large 
buyers are “not sufficient to conclude that market power is effectively constrained” 
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(Competition Authority, 2002, para. 4.10).  Rather “[E]ffective buyer power requires that 
buyers have alternative sources of supply, or are capable of credibly threatening to set up 
alternative supply arrangements” (ibid, para. 4.10).  The Competition Authority has applied 
this approach in considering claims of countervailing buyer power, in, for example, the 
Kerry/Breeo merger (Competition Authority, 2008a). 
The Consultation Paper proposes that the 2002 Guidelines “could be amended to 
include a greater level of detail” including examples of countervailing buyer power 
(Competition Authority, 2010a, para. 2.23).  While the criticism made above in Section IV 
concerning vagueness and lack of precision applies to these proposals, there is one respect 
in which current Competition Authority practice in relation to countervailing buyer power 
could be incorporated in the revised Guidelines.  Furthermore it has a more general 
application in terms of evidence and hence could be incorporated into the earlier discussion 
on evidence.  This refers to the probative value of post-merger evidence compared to pre-
merger evidence.  This reflects the general point that internal documents, memorandum, 
communications with customers, competitors and suppliers pre-consideration of the merger 
are less likely to be tainted or influenced by the proposed merger.  In contrast, post-
consideration of the merger, especially post-notification, documents and communications 
are much more likely to be influenced by the merger and hence need to be treated 
accordingly.  While this issue arose in the case of a specific merger, Kerry/Breeo, which 
hinged on the issue of countervailing buyer power, the point is more general.36   
Efficiencies 
The 2002 Guidelines discuss the question of efficiencies at some length (Competition 
Authority, 2002, paras 5.9-5.16).   Like countervailing buyer power, merging parties 
frequently claim efficiencies will offset any likely anti-competitive effects of a merger.  
However, in close to 500 merger determinations since 2003, the Competition Authority has 
never cleared a merger on the grounds that the efficiencies are sufficient to offset the 
anticompetitive effects of the merger.  Furthermore, apart from the Kerry/Breeo merger 
(Competition Authority, 2008a), it is difficult to think of a merger where the parties 
furnished extensive evidence of efficiencies.  While there are a variety of reasons for this 
state of affairs (Gorecki et al, 2007, pp. 365-366), lack of clarity in the 2002 Guidelines do not 
seem to one of these.  Nevertheless, the Consultation Paper proposes “a more complete 
discussion of efficiencies” providing three examples of what it has in mind (Competition 
                                                                                                                                                                      
36  The issue, in the context of Kerry/Breeo  merger is discussed in Gorecki (2009a). 
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Authority, 2010a, para. 2.25).  However, it is not clear the extent to which the issues raised 
by two of the three examples are not already covered by the 2002 Guidelines, a general 
criticism of the Consultation Paper made in Section IV above.  In the case of the third 
example, its relevance and rationale needs to be specified, otherwise it is likely to make 
providing credible evidence on merger related efficiencies even more onerous that it already 
is by imposing an additional evidentiary burden on the notifying parties to a merger, but 
without any accompanying gain in terms of evaluating a merger. 
The Consultation Paper proposes that greater elaboration could be furnished of “the 
extent and probability of cost efficiencies” and “the evidence (including the level of 
specificity of efficiencies) that the parties should submit” (Competition Authority, 2010a, 
para 2.25).  However, these issues are already discussed in the 2002 Guidelines (Competition 
Authority, 2002, paras 5.10-5.15 and para 5.16, respectively).  It would therefore have been 
helpful if the Consultation Paper had been more explicit as to what the Competition 
Authority proposed to add to the 2002 Guidelines.  The third example in the Consultation 
Paper of where more discussion is merited concerns “the distribution of efficiency gains to 
consumers, staff and shareholders” (Competition Authority, 2010a, para 2.25).   This is 
certainly a departure from current practice.  At the present time in the 2002 Guidelines, “an 
increase in the price-cost margin resulting from a merger may be compensated by a 
reduction that leaves the eventual market price unchanged or lower …  . In essence, it uses a 
‘net price test:’ by considering whether the price paid by consumers will rise or fall as a 
result of the merger” (Competition Authority, 2002, para 5.9).  Hence what is relevant is the 
degree to which efficiencies are able to offset or more than offset the price enhancing 
impact of the merger, not whether consumers have 10 or 50 or 80 per cent of the efficiency 
gains.  The idea that consumers should have a fair share of efficiency gains is relevant in 
considering under Section 4(5) of the Act, for agreements that may breach Section 4(1).37  
However, it is not at all clear what purpose is served in estimating the allocation of efficiency 
gains by consumers, staff and shareholders in the analysis of efficiencies in merger cases.  A 
reference to the US (USDoJ&FTC, 2010, pp. 29-31), UK (CC&OFT, 2010, pp. 55-58), and 
Australian (ACCC, 2008, pp. 51-52) Guidelines provides no clues as to why the distribution is 
important.38  The Competition Authority needs to make a case as to why this should be 
included, before imposing an added burden in merging parties in filing an efficiency defence.  
                                                                                                                                                                      
37  These provisions correspond to Articles 101(3) and 101(1), respectively, of the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union. 
38  The ICN Recommended Practices for mergers have as yet to address the issue of efficiencies. 
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Maverick Firms 
The 2002 Merger Guidelines contain several references to the maverick firm (Competition 
Authority, 2002, paras 3.11(d), 4.8, 4.14(e), 4.24, 6.6 & 7.2).  Some merger determinations, 
particularly Heineken/Scottish& Newcastle (Competition Authority, 2008b) contain further 
discussion of the concept of the maverick firm and its application to merger analysis.  The 
Consultation Paper notes that in the 2002 Guidelines reference is made to the maverick firm 
in several contexts, including competitive effects (Competition Authority, 2010a, para 2.26).  
It then states that international best practice suggests that the effects of a maverick firm are 
most likely to be relevant in analysing coordinated effects.  The Consultation Paper then 
proposes that the 2002 Guidelines could be amended “to include a more complete 
discussion of the significance of maverick firms … including that the loss of a maverick firm is 
most relevant in the context of potential coordinated effects” (ibid, para. 2.27).  Again this is 
an example of the general point made in Section IV above of proposals that are too vague.  
What is meant by a more complete discussion?  Has the Competition Authority has 
complaints that the 2002 Guidelines were inadequate in the discussion of the maverick firm?  
The Consultation Paper is silent on these questions and hence it is difficult to come to a view 
as to whether or not a more complete discussion is useful. 
Remedies 
The Consultation Paper quite rightly points out the Competition Authority “has applied 
remedies to address competition concerns arising from a number of mergers” (Competition 
Authority, 2010a, para 2.28).  These include: 
• monitoring arrangements, sometimes quite complex  (e.g. Competition 
Authority, 2005a);  
• reporting requirements involving another regulatory agency, the Commission 
for Communications Regulation (Competition Authority, 2005b); 
• inform and when requested notify mergers39 to the Competition Authority in 
a specific market (Competition Authority, 2004a; 2005c); 
• conditions on how the merged entity conducts aspects of its business 
(Competition Authority, 2005d); 
• divestiture of a business, together with arrangements for a trustee and hold 
separate obligations (Competition Authority, 2007c); and 
                                                                                                                                                                      
39  This refers to mergers below the notification threshold which can be voluntarily notified under the Act. 
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• divestiture of a business that consisted largely of a brand (Competition 
Authority, 2006b). 
In some instances the Competition Authority has conducted extensive market testing 
on the merger remedies offered by the merging parties (Competition Authority, 2007c). 
The 2002 Guidelines are silent on the issue of remedies, while at the same time there 
is no separate existing guidance on the topic of remedies from the Competition Authority.  
Hence the Competition Authority in assessing issues relating to merger remedies often 
draws on the experience and guidance issued by the European Commission (2004a) and the 
UK Competition Commission (2004).  The Consultation Paper proposes the 2002 Guidelines 
“could be amended to provide a more complete discussion of remedies” (Competition 
Authority, 2010a, para. 2.28).   The more complete discussion would include why the 
Competition Authority would prefer a remedy in contrast to blocking the merger and 
provision of examples of behavioural and structural remedies.  The revised Guidelines would 
also set out the Competition Authority’s approach to remedies in “addressing competition 
concerns arising from a merger” (ibid, para. 2.28). 
It would be useful for the revised Guidelines to develop the Competition Authority’s 
approach to remedies.  This appears to be a preference for structural over behavioural 
remedies, but at the same time the remedy should be proportionate to the competition 
concern being addressed.  As a result in some instances, a behavioural or conduct remedy 
may be more appropriate than a structural one.  However, the discussion of remedies in the 
revised Guidelines should not preclude the Competition Authority from either developing its 
own guidance note on remedies in a separate document or else stating that reliance will be 
placed on (say) European Union guidance but subject to some adjustment and adaption. 
6. Some Additional Considerations 
One of the hallmarks of modern merger analysis is the rise in importance of mergers with 
unilateral as opposed to coordinated effects (Shapiro, 2010, p. 60).  Ireland is no exception 
to this trend (Gorecki et al, 2007, Table III, p. 356).40 In response to this there has been a 
development of merger assessment methods that build on the degree to which the merging 
firms’ products or services are close substitutes for each other, captured by the degree to 
which consumers will switch from products of one of the merging parties to products of the 
                                                                                                                                                                      
40  Shapiro is referring to the period 1992 to 2010.  Data for Ireland for such a period does not exist.  However, 
for the shorter period 2003-2006 the evidence shows that the vast majority of mergers that required 
extensive analysis by the Competition Authority the concerns were unilateral rather than coordinated.  See 
references in text for details. 
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other, in the event of a price rise in the former.  This is referred to the displacement effect; 
and the profit margin of the merging parties, where the latter can be used as an indication of 
the degree of competition.  Thus a merger involving high degree of displacement and high 
margins indicates a situation where competitive concerns are more likely to arise.  As a 
result various measures have been developed to take into account this possibility, the latest 
generation of which is referred to as measures of upward pressure on prices (“UPP”) 
measures.41 
The 2002 Guidelines refer to the concept of displacement (Competition Authority, 
2002, para. 4.6) while Competition Authority merger determinations typically refer to the 
concept of closeness of competition (Competition Authority, 2008b) which underlies the 
concept of displacement.  The 2002 Guidelines also point out that if the merging parties 
produce close substitutes for a differentiated product that there may be competition 
concerns even though the market shares “are not particularly high” (Competition Authority, 
2002, para, 4.14(a)).  Indeed, using the usual HHI thresholds referred to above a merger in 
such a situation might not indicate prima facie competition concerns.  However, there is no 
mention in the 2002 Guidelines of the gross margin and it is not typically relied on 
Competition Authority merger determinations, nor used in combination with the 
displacement ratio. 
In view of the constant references in the Consultation Paper to international best 
practice and reference in the accompanying news release to “advances in the economic 
analysis underlying merger review,”42  it would have been useful had the Consultation Paper 
raised two issues: first, the implications of the move towards unilateral effects as the 
relevant theory of harm in merger analysis and thus how the reliance on structural measures 
such as HHI indexes may be less than reliable indicators of where competition concerns are 
located; and the suggestion that in unilateral effects cases an alternative approach might be 
the deployment of UPP measures.  These have been developed and applied in the UK in 
cases and the concept is referred to in the recently revised UK Guidelines (CC&OFT, 2010, 
paras 5.4.9-5.4.10).  The same applies to the US Guidelines (USDoJ&FTC, 2010, p. 21). 
                                                                                                                                                                      
41  For further discussion see, for example, Farrell & Shapiro (2010), Shapiro (2010, pp. 97-101) and Simons & 
Coate (2010). 
42  Competition Authority (2010h).  The advances in economic analysis is given as one of the reasons for the 
review of the 2002 Guidelines, but it is not clear how that is reflected in the Consultation Paper.  
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7. Lessons 
A number of lessons can be drawn from the Competition Authority’s experience revising the 
2002 Guidelines that are likely to have wider applicability to other competition authorities 
considering revising their Guidelines.   
• One of, if not the, purposes of the Guidelines, irrespective of the jurisdiction, is 
provide practical advice to merging parties and their advisors in considering 
whether or not a proposed merger is likely to be cleared.43  This is achieved by 
setting out in the Guidelines the competition authority’s custom and practice 
in merger assessment.  To be sure there are likely to be some differences 
between competition authorities.  For example, in some jurisdictions the remit 
for merger control may be confined largely or solely to the competition 
authority, while in others there may be a much richer set of legal precedents 
on which to draw.  Nevertheless, this does not detract from the viewpoint that 
the Guidelines set out the competition authority’s merger evaluation 
methodology so that the merging parties can establish whether or not a 
potential merger meets the relevant merger test and what evidence is needed 
to satisfy that test.  The Guidelines thus need to be clear, concise and readily 
understood, containing the minimum of legal and economic jargon.  
• Proposals for revising the Guidelines should carefully distinguish between 
those that incorporate existing merger assessment custom and practice and 
proposals that mark a departure from current Guidelines as well as existing 
custom and practice.   The former set can be illustrated drawing on merger 
determinations, while the latter might draw on developments in merger 
theory and/or the practice elsewhere.  
• Proposals for revising the Guidelines, particularly when setting out and 
explaining existing custom and practice, should be specific rather than general.  
If the proposals consist of clarification, nuancing, providing greater detail, 
and/or furnishing a more complete discussion, then the suggested wording 
should be provided for comment.  Absent this it is difficult to comment 
helpfully on the proposed changes.   
                                                                                                                                                                      
43 For example, the US Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, stated in 2010 that, “[O]ur Guidelines are 
meant to inform practioners and the business community of the Agencies’ standards for evaluating 
mergers.”Cited in Shapiro (2010, p. 58). 
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• Proposals for revising the Guidelines that rely on international best practice 
still need to carefully explain its relevance and rationale.  International best 
practice is not a one size fits all, so that  attention needs to be paid to local 
economic and legal circumstances. 
• In revising the Guidelines proposals should consider the importance of 
multijurisdictional mergers.  Mergers are sometimes notified in more than one 
jurisdiction so it makes sense to be cognisance of developments in these 
jurisdictions in revising Guidelines.  This is likely to be especially relevant for 
smaller economies. 
• In revising the Guidelines the competition authority should carefully set out 
the steps involved in the process of revising and issuing new Guidelines at the 
beginning of the process.  Time should be permitted not only for submissions 
on the initial proposals, but also draft revised Guidelines.  The more extensive 
and complex the proposed changes in the Guidelines, the more elaborate will 
be the review process.44  
                                                                                                                                                                      
44  In the case of the 2002 Guidelines the proposals are by and large elaboration of existing practices and as such 
not a major departure. Hence the limited number of steps as set out in Section III above. In contrast, the US 
revision of its Guidelines was a much more involved process with many more steps (Shapiro, 2010, p. 701), 
reflecting the fact that the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines replaced those that were issued in 1992, 
amended in 1997.  Equally the issuing of joint rather than separate Guidelines by the Competition 
Commission and the Office of Fair Trading also resulted in an extensive consultation process prior to 
completion.  For full details see Competition Commission website.  This can be accessed at: 
http://www.competition-
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